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DEMOBILISATION FOR RECONSTIICTION: Parameters For Progress
THE PROBLEM
Since the collapse o f the Barre Regime and the expulsion o f its troops in 1991 Somaliland has 
regained peace, law and order. The National Army o f  about 17,500 men has consolidated most 
sub-clan militias, the liberation forces from the SNM which were not demobilised in 1991, as 
well as Somalilanders who served in the Barre army elsewhere in the then United Republic o f  
Somalia.
The army is responsible to a civilian Minister o f Defence who is responsible to the President and 
to the Somaliland Houses o f  Assembly and o f Elders. A 5,000 person civilian police force is 
accountable to and through the M inister o f the Interior and a 1,000 person custodial (prison) 
service to and through the M inister for Justice.
The three uniformed services number 23,500 (non uniformed public servants are somewhat 
under 6,000). Their quarters, meals, uniforms and pay engross about $18 million o f  $25 million 
central government expenditure. For the army the reality is room and board, uniform and pocket 
money and the other uniformed services are only slightly better paid. The police, and especially 
the army, are inadequately equipped not least in relation to mobility and communication.
The initial demobilisation o f about 20,000 personnel who had fought to expel the Barre regime, 
the creation o f a national, cross sub-clan civilian police force and the gradual gathering o f almost 
all sub-clan militias (perhaps 1,000 to 1,500 remain outside) into the national army have been 
crucial to restoring peace, stability and law throughout almost all parts o f Somaliland. In 
contrast to Somalia the armed forces are responsible to a territorial civilian government not to 
sub clan units, still less to self appointed warlords. This both enables them to enforce 
peace/mediate disputes among persons o f different sub clans before they escalate and also 
reduces the risk o f resort to clans - acting as the House o f Elders - to resolve disagreements and 
tensions which do arise between sub-Klans.
The initial demobilisation process has been substantially - but not wholly - successful.
M erchants in 1991-2 contributed resources to assist demobilisees while they rehabilitated
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civilian livelihoods. An inclusive (SNM, other militias, Somlilanders who served in Barre's 
army - in other parts o f the URS as part o f his manipulation o f relational loyalties - and ex 
British and Italian soldiers) exists and serves to represent, counsel and - to the extent it can raise 
resources - provide vocational training, physical rehabilitation for handicapped and opportunities 
for socialisation.
The government has created a National Veterans' Commission to assist in the process o f 
reintegration and rehabilitation o f livelihoods. It secured advice from Zimbabweans on the 
process in their country but has been gravely limited by lack o f resources.
O f about 20,000 demobilised combatants perhaps 15,000 have regained civilian livelihoods. 
Regained because those who had established occupations and households before going to the 
liberation war largely returned to them so that most present soldiers are young men with little or 
no civilian livelihood training or experience. At least 5,000 veterans have not satisfactorily re­
established civilian livelihoods whether because o f  inadequate training, access to initial capital 
(whether for commerce, pasturalism or agro pasturalism) or physical and mental damage from 
the war years.
The psychological and/or social isolation problems o f  Somaliland demobilisees are, in general, 
less severe than in many other countries. The Somali National M ovement's forces perceive 
themselves and are perceived by most Somalilanders, as having won a liberation struggle. That 
has created generally positive self and societal images - except for those who have failed to 
establish livelihoods and are trapped in severe poverty.
Further demobilisation is crucial for three reasons:
1. only about 5,000 men are needed in the army - but with better training, mobility, 
communications and equipment as well as less derisory cash pay;
2. the police and custodial services are at or near requisite levels and provide no outlet for army
dischargees;
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3. the budgetary burden o f 12,500 surplus soldiers - potentially rising to 14,000 with the
incorporation o f  the remaining militias - is now crippling and will remain severe even when 
tax collection is improved.
Rehabilitation for the 5,000 or more non reintegrated demobilised veterans is also needed to
strengthen society and to reduce threats to law and order.
Demobilisation, however, requires substantial resources:
1. to demobilise men with, and trained in the use of, guns but with little other occupational 
training or experience without providing for their economic rehabilitation through training is 
virtually certain to lead directly to the recreation o f  sub clan, or self proclaimed, militias 
and/or to outbreaks o f freelance banditry;
2. the President has expressed the national sentiment that it is unjust as well as most imprudent 
to throw veterans into poverty or into temporary, low pay, dead end unskilled labour;
3. the cost o f systematic vocational training and initial work experience (on infrastructure and 
building renewal and mine raising) over five to six years would total on the order for $20 to 
$25 million a year, o f the order o f $9 to $12 per Somalilander per year;
4. even assuming substantial rehabilitation and enhanced coverage in the tax system the need to 
restore basic public services and o f living wages to those proving them mean that this sum - 
like that for renewing main national and interstate commercial (port, highway, airport) 
infrastructure is beyond the capacity o f  the Government o f  Somaliland.
THE PROPOSAL
The proposal is to:
1. demobilise 12,500 to 14,000 army personnel via an 18 month secondment to vocational 
education and on the job training followed by discharge;
2. in parallel to provide vocational training (and where necessary physical/mental rehabilitation) 
to 5,000 past demobilisees who have not successfully reintegrated into the civilian economy;
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3. to do so primarily through construction (civil engineering and building) vocational education, 
on the job training and provision o f basic tools and secondarily, through an enhanced mine 
raising operation over a period o f  5 - 6 years;
4. to use the ILO - because o f its vocational training, labour intensive construction and Horn o f 
Africa experience - as the central external contractor with resource providers and with the 
National Veterans Commission and Association, the National M ines Commission and the 
Ministries o f  Planning and o f Finance who would be put in funds for food, shelter, clothing 
and allowances paid to demobilisees in training by the ILO;
5. To seek funds from the EU (ECHO), Norway - Denmark - Sweden - Finland (Nordic Group), 
Switzerland, UK, USA. For the training/work experience construction programme the cost 
(assuming 14,000 army demobilizees and 6,000 already demobilised veterans) would be o f 
the order o f $100-110 million over a five year phased programme with six m onths’ training 
and 12 m onths’ work experience for each demobilisee;
6. The mines programme - for which cost parameters are much vaguer because o f data 
limitations - would probably cost $30-35 million over five years assuming 500 additional 
Somaliland demobilizees. That would imply raising o f the order o f 100,000 mines per year. 
For the enhanced mines raising component (which is desirable but not essential to overall 
demobilisation and reintegration) the present Mines Commission together with UNDP would 
seem the preferred channel to maintain continuity. The main potential funders are the same.
7. The outputs o f the programme would include:
a) Reintegration into the civilian economy o f 20,000 persons (in the medium term heads o f 
households o f - say - 100,000 plus persons);
b) substantially increasing trained construction personnel numbers and thus both civil 
engineering and construction capacity (whether as self-employed, small firm or 
employees o f larger contractors);
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c) consolidating economic and social stability by meeting the needs o f  actually or 
potentially marginalised young men by interim training and permanent relevant human 
capital/livelihood opportunity provision;
d) rehabilitation, renewing and extending Somaliland’s transport, water, public buildings 
(e.g. Schools, clinics, water service - veterinary - extension facilities and other works as 
well as enhanced mines clearance;
e) removing the fiscal drag o f  maintaining a large number o f uniformed personnel in excess 
o f military requirements to avoid the results o f demobilising young men with guns into 
severe immediate poverty and poor long term prospects.
At a probable cost over five years o f the order o f $120,000,000 ($12 per Somalilander per 
year) this appears highly cost efficient.
8. What to include requires preliminary study, cataloguing and estimation o f vocationally
trained personnel, professional and experienced artisinal staff, equipment/tools and materials 
prior to final financing proposals. The pre repair/construction studies and final scheduling 
can be done during the first six m onths’ training o f the first tranche o f entrants.
a) the Berbera-Hargeisa - Djijiga - Addis Ababa corridor renewal and expansion is not very 
suitable for a labour intensive approach and should be financed/
implemented separately as an EU Horn Regional Fund programme jointly with Ethiopia.
b) the Hargeisa-Berbera - Djibouti route could perhaps be financed similarly but - because 
o f much lower traffic volume - could be a labour intensive, engineered gravel project, 
with wells/boreholes at 25 or 50 km intervals to end present loss o f life from breakdowns 
on waterless stretches;
c) the replacement (assuming it is cheaper than demining and repair o f  pre-war highway) o f 
Hargeisa - Burao highway is a priority as are other secondary highways (including back 
and preventative maintenance on Erigavo-Los Anard-Somalia border routes) are 
priorities;
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d) secondary airport/airstrip major maintenance and renewal is appropriate. Hargeisa and 
perhaps Berbera airport equipment aspects could best be handled as part o f the corridor 
programme with Ethiopia but runway renewal and extension and building repairs and 
extension are probably suitable for a labour intensive approach;
e) some aspects o f urban and rural, human and livestock water provision including dry 
wells, spring to use point trenched wells, birkets and check dams and perhaps (especially 
as to training) drilled wells plus water service warehouses and offices are an important 
part o f social and economic infrastructure renewal;
f) while schools and clinics (up to secondary and 100 bed hospitals) can be repaired by 
labour intensive methods;
g) as can courts, police stations and general administrative offices (both urban and rural).
9. In respect to basic services, and to water in particular, construction for urban government and 
community projects should be included subject to provision o f evidence on financial and 
personnel capacity to operate and to maintain. However, the programme should not build for 
the private housing and commercial establishment markets because to do so would be to 
compete with the opportunities for its graduates to establish livelihoods.
10. Enhanced demining is somewhat separate from other programme aspects. There are 22 or 23 
known minefields - o f very divergent geographic extent, density o f mining, mine numbers 
and types, detailed data on configuration and cost in terms o f deaths, disabling accidents and 
sterilisation o f otherwise useful land, water, or works (by much o f Buraa-Hurgeisa highway 
and part o f Buraa urban infrastructure). There are no accurate estimates o f mines laid, lifted, 
or degraded to innocuousness - 1,000,000 to 2,500,000 is the apparent plausible range for 
remaining live mines. The National Mines Commission (supported by UNDP) has a 
relatively small, but effective, demining and mine avoidance education programme. Mine 
lifting is - correctly in terms o f urgency - focussed on Burao. At its present pace it would 
probably take a third o f a century to raise or demobilise all existing mines.
11. More funding and more labour intensive methods (including for identifying and posting off 
minefields and for community - especially mother and child-education) are both a priority
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need and practical. About 1,000 surviving Somalilanders were trained in mine raising during 
the demining operated by Rimfire (under UNDP/UNOSOM contract) in the early 1990s.
Both because they have not been working on demining for five years and because their 
methods and training were inadequate they would need six m onths’ training (and subsequent 
professional leadership) for effective and safe (especially to themselves) demining, 
delineation and community education. About 500 are probably available as some have 
reintegrated into other livelihoods and have no desire to return to a specialised and highly 
dangerous occupation.
12. In this sub-programme a special risk allowance, field medical capacity, and compensation for 
injury or death (to survivors o f  dependants, heirs) would need to be included in costings (as 
was not the case in the Rimfire era).
MODALITIES
13. The first stage should be a Government o f Somaliland exercise to establish desired enrolment 
numbers, phasing, project components, livelihood market and skills requirements and 
therefore curriculum, professional and artisinal personnel requirements and rough financing 
mobilisation targets. This could be led by the Ministry o f  Planning/National Veterans 
Commission in association with Defence, Veterans Association, Finance and the project 
providing departments (especially Transport, Water, Veterinary, Agricultural Extension, 
Education, Health, Police and Justice) and other potential beneficiaries (urban councils, 
voluntary organisations). It would be helpful if  a small technical assistance financial unit 
could serve as a secretariat:
a) a general economic policy economist with African planning experience and prior 
knowledge o f Somaliland;
b) two experienced Zimbabwe demobilisation and training officers (preferably including at 
least one from the earlier mission);
c) two ILO staff with African vocational and labour intensive construction experience;
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d) ten degree or comparable level professionally trained Somalilanders probably recruited 
from the diaspora and - assuming the project goes ahead - to form the core staff for the 
National Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission.
14. The cost over six months (including emoluments, travel, office equipment, communications, 
etc.) would be o f the order o f $500,000. Two possible sources are the ILO (either from its 
own funds or seeking special support from Nordic countries, Netherlands, Canada and/or 
Japan) and - in respect to the Zimbabweans and their Somalilander counterparts - the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.
15. One issue to be decided is the number o f centres and the practicability o f using existing 
barracks for army personnel during vocational training and work experience. Presumably 
discipline and order as well as logistical considerations point to army personnel being under 
discipline (as, presumably, many non commissioned and junior commissioned officers will 
be demobilised this could be achieved within the education and work units) until completion 
o f  the 18 months and continue during that time to be provided with room, meals and clothing 
by the army (as sub-contracted to the ILO).
16. Effective training unit size suggests not less than 500 students per vocational unit which 
probably implies three initial centres and a further three to four later. Logical locations - 
subject to barrack availability would be: Hargeisa, Boramo, Burao, Berbera, Sheikh, Erigavo 
and Las Anod. In general buildings for the training as well as works depots will need to be 
built. A scatter - six provincial capitals plus Sheikh - would facilitate use o f barracks during 
construction work and limit the amount o f time in field tent camps. Previous demobilisees 
should be offered the option o f room, clothes, meals or an equivalent stipend in lieu - 
especially for urban residents with households.
17. At the time o f the technical assistance request all potential funders identified should be 
informed o f the intent to develop and submit a programme proposal. By the end o f  three 
months enough information should be available for the National Demobilisation and 
Veterans Commission together with ILO to begin formal programme funding negotiations.
18. An analogous procedure - involving the National Mines Commission, Planning Finance, 
UNDP and UNICEF (because o f  the particular vulnerability o f  children - and o f mothers 
seeking to retrieve them from dangerous areas - to mines). Two specialists would be needed 
- probably for six to twelve weeks: one on techniques o f mine location identification and 
raising, exploding or otherwise deactivating and the second on delineation, fencing and 
community education to reduce casualties from unraised mines. They should be backed up 
by and work with four Somalilanders who would then become Commission staff for the 
operational programme. The cost might be $125,000 which would appear to be within the 
range o f possible UNICEF ($50,000) and UNDP ($75,000) funding from their own budgets 
or special funds.
19. The second phase leading up to the implementation - also o f the order o f six months - would 
conclude funding negotiations and include ILO-National Demobilisation and Veterans 
Commission, Veterans Association, Finance, Planning and Defense personnel, equipment 
and building mobilisation as well as more identification o f particular projects and their 
requirements.
20. The operational phase would be for 60 months with intakes in months 0, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36 
and 42, and completion o f the last intake’s training and supervised work experience in month 
60. Assuming the mines programme is for three years, its Somaliland personnel (say 500) 
should begin training in month 36 or 42 because mine raising embodies skills which are not 
readily transferable to other livelihoods. (For purposes o f this paper a three year mine raising 
programme reviewed late in the second year to determine whether an extension is needed is 
envisaged). Ideally finance for the entire five years should be committed in advance. A 
possible alternative would be a three year definitive commitment and a more tentative one for 
the final two years subject to a review at the end o f the second year.
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21. Tentative schedule.
Enrolment Total Programme Members
Army Demobilisees Training Work Experience
M onth 0 1000 500 1500 -
6 1500 500 2000 1500
12 1500 500 2000 3500
18 2000 750 2750 4000
24 2000 750 2750 4750
30 2000 750 2750 5500
36 2000 750 2750 5500
42 2500 500 2000 5500
48 - - - 4750
54 - - - 2000
60 - - - -
14000 5000
PRELIM INARY DRAFT BUDGET ($ USA)
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22. M ain Program m e
Planning and Initial Negotiation 500,000
Final Negotiation and Mobilisation
5
1,500,000
Room-Meals-Clothing Costs
19,000 x 18 months x $60 20,520,000
Allowances (Vocational Training)
19,000 x 6 months x $25 2,850,000
Wages (W ork Experience)
19,000 x 12 months x $100 21,800,000
Professional Personnela’b
20 x$70,000 x 5 years 7,000,000
Experienced Artisanal Personnela’b
150 x $10,000 x 5 years 7,500,000
Accommodation Repair and Expansion c 5,000,000
Training Buildings and Equipment 5,000,000
Depots and Construction Tools/Equipment 20,000,000
Transport Vehicles 5,000,000
Construction M aterials d 10,000,000
Graduate Tool Kits ($500 x 19,000)e 9,500,000
ILO C o s ts ' 2,500,000
Demobilisation and Veterans Commission C o s ts f 1,250,000
TOTAL $120,000,000
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NOTES
a. Assumes half o f  professionals and 80% to 90% o f experienced artisans are recruited from 
Somali diaspora at emoluments levels similar to their present earnings not international 
(Northern technical assistance) scales. Non Somali African as well as other expatriates 
would be on ta scales.
b. Assumes half training and half construction team leadership.
c. Assumes substantial use o f  existing barracks.
d. Very rough estimate.
e. To enable graduates to operate in areas o f training/experience.
f. Administration, Accounting, Review, Planning and Programming.
23. Mine Raising-Delineation-Education Sub Programme 
(For Three years - $ ) a
Planning and Initial Negotiations 125,000
Final Negotiations and M obilisation 250,000
Pay - 500 x 36 x $250 b 4,500,000
Room - Meals - Clothing 500x36x60 1,080,000
Injury and Death Compensation c 2,750,000
Professional Personnel 10+15x3 years
x 150,000 (including insurance) d 5,500,000
Field Medical Facilities e 2,500,000
Equipment and Supplies e 12,500,000
Transport Vehicles 2,500,000
Delineation and Education r 2,000,000
UNDP Costs 8 750,000
National Mines Commission h 1,250,000
TOTAL $36,000,000
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NOTES
a. Vocational/W ork Experience costs for post mining livelihood included in main 
programme.
b. $250/month because o f much higher risk and non-transferability o f  skills.
c. It is blind optimism to assume no casualties and unjustifiable not to provide for 
compensation. 10 deaths at $50,000 and 150 serious injuries at $15,000 very rough 
guesstimate.
d. It appears doubtful Somaliland professional exist to be hired beyond any now in service 
on the ongoing smaller programme.
e. Rough guesstimate.
f. Personnel included above.
g. Supervision, review, audit.
h. Administration, accounting, review and planning.
24. Combined Programme Costs $156,000,000 ($15 per Somalilander per year over five
years.)
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ANNEX
NOTE FOR REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND SENIOR PERSONNEL ONLY
This proposal does not require de jure  external recognition, but - if achieved - will strengthen the 
case for it.
To finance even substantial reconstruction aid - (which can if a donor so chooses be categorised 
as humanitarian) does not require formal recognition o f a state but rather:
1. a body o f lenders and an institutional structure with which it can work;
2. a context o f peace, order, rule o f  law;
3. willingness to accept that the authorities do at the least represent a 'regional' (EU sense) or 
'provincial' authority and/or governmental/societal bodies commanding substantial 
legitimacy.
Both common sense examination on the ground and some existing external agency practice (e.g. 
UNDP in respect to Mines Commission, UNCTAD in respect to port o f Berbera, UNICEF in 
respect to Ministries o f Health and o f Water, UNHCR) demonstrate that these three conditions 
are - and can be seen to be - met.
The Veterans Association, National Veterans' Commission and National Mines Authority can be 
used as domestic partners if donors prefer not to deal directly and formally with the Ministry o f  
Defence. It would be preferable if they did deal directly with Finance and Planning but, if 
necessary, this can be done via those Ministries' representatives on the Mines and Veterans 
bodies.
The use o f  ILO as a lead external agency is fully justified on its training and works experience - 
not least in sub-Saharan Africa. It is also convenient for two other reasons:
1. The Somaliland public service is not now capable o f handling a large scale project cluster 
and - if possible - should focus on services which are permanent and not suitable for external 
sub-contracting e.g. health, education, water, veterinary, agricultural extension;
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2. the ILO intermediary role as main contractor/auditor will reassure donors. It can - however 
organised - see that the participants are fed, housed, clothed and paid allowances and any 
decision by it to use the Ministry o f Defence for part o f this will be much easier for donors to 
accept than direct payment by them to the Ministry.
Thus recognition can be side-stepped and the pretence o f reserving judgement maintained by 
foreign governments.
However:
1. the success o f the programme will strengthen Somaliland's economy, governmental and civil 
society capacity and national unity increasingly the implausibility o f  denying that it is a state,
2. the more agencies, governments and persons have worked with Somaliland, the more the 
habit o f  co-operation will slide into informal de facto recognition and thence toward 
recognition;
3. if  - as appears likely - no unified government/state emerges in Somalia (indeed no sub­
national analogue to Somaliland either) the contrast between that and a stable polity 
providing a growing level o f  basic public services to its people in a relatively buoyant 
economy and possessing substantial domestic legitimacy in Somaliland will make a 'wait for 
reunion' approach increasingly hard to justify and a preference for a future Confederal 
Somalia' consistent with recognising the Republic o f Somaliland as a first step.
The direct recognition case is o f course that the URS never legally united Somaliland and 
Somalia linked to the fact that the OAU's 1964 'boundaries at independence' was in large part 
aimed at the URS' 5 Star Flag which to its neighbours was a flag o f armed aggression. The 
Republic o f  Somaliland became independent from the UK in 1960 within the boundaries it now 
claims. It was illegally annexed by force into the URS after voting 'No' on unification. It 
regained its independence by force o f arms in 1991. That case needs to be put clearly and 
repeatedly to the OAU (asking Salim Salim to check on background to 1964 OAU declaration) 
and to African states. To this end the more African Ambassadors to
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OAU who can be brought to Somaliland to see for themselves, the better. If the OAU can be 
convinced, the USA and UK and, probably EU will follow rapidly. In the meantime the 
approach o f  seeking useful practical relationships which in practice - though not formally - 
reinforce the recognition case should be carried on in parallel.
RHG/br/dfs/demob.doc 12/10/99
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